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Humanitarian Intervention
Daniel Wolf

INTRODUCTION

In response to the shock they experienced at discovering the barbaric murder of
six million Jews perpetrated by Nazi Germany, the nations of the world in 1948
adopted the Genocide Convention in order to "liberate mankind from such an
odious scourge" as genocide.' But despite this well intentioned goal, the international community has since failed to prevent the mass slaughter of human beings
which has come very near to a recurring theme during the period after the defeat
of the Nazis in World War Two.
Since the German genocide against the Jews, genocides have been perpetrated
in Bangladesh, Rwanda and Burundi, Indonesia, Biafra, Uganda, and Kampuchea. Yet, despite the frequency with which such genocides have occurred and
the revulsion they have sparked in the heart of the world community, the response
of nations to crimes being perpetrated by a state upon its own citizens has been
disturbingly acquiescent. Perhaps equally disturbing is the tendency to attempt to
excuse such acquiescence as essential to the preservation of the international legal
order, for in the final analysis -it is the failure of the world community to provide
redress for the victims of the very worst crime against humanity that most
threatens to destabilize and destroy the law of nations.
Because it is virtually inconceivable that peaceful means of persuasion will
influence a government bent upon mass slaughter of its citizens to mend its brutal
ways, the prevention of genocide will almost always require forceful intervention
on a large scale. The compelling need to prevent human misery and to see that
justice is done will, therefore, inevitably clash with norms proscribing the use of
force in international law. Since a great number of scholars view the United
Nations Charter prohibition on the use of force as absolute except in cases of selfdefense, 2 there has been a good deal of skepticism regarding the lawfulness of so* Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. B.A. 1982, Northwestern University; J.D. 1986, University of Michigan Law School.
The Department of State, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for the private publications
of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Department of State, the Secretary, or the author's colleagues on the staff.
I. Preamble of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A.

Res. 260A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Convention on Genocide].
2. See infra notes 19 and 20.
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called humanitarian 3 intervention, 4 even to prevent genocide. Such skepticism
exists despite almost universal agreement that genocide - or the mass slaughter
of human beings - is an international crime both by virtue of convention5 and by
virtue of customary international law. 6 Moreover, even the most ardent opponents
of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention are perfectly willing to concede that
the use of armed force, strictly tailored to prevent crimes against humanity, is not
only morally blameless behavior, but is actually ethically commendable. 7
This article argues that humanitarian intervention to prevent the mass slaughter
by a state of its own citizens is not only a morally but a legally justifiable act
under current norms of international law. The first section of the article discusses
the traditional international legal rules concerning the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention and their relevance to contemporary law. The second section analyzes the effect of the advent of the United Nations Charter on the legality of
humanitarian intervention. Drawing on state practice and the opinion of the
international legal community, the third section argues that the emergence of a
post-Charter doctrine of humanitarian intervention now constitutes a new exception to the prohibition on the use of force. The fourth section analyzes the
relationship between humanitarian intervention and the world legal order and
concludes that there are compelling moral, jurisprudential, and policy arguments
which favor recognition of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Finally, the
fifth section delineates the accepted criteria for a lawful intervention on humanitarian grounds. The article concludes that, at a minimum, international law
accepts the unilateral or collective use of armed force to prevent mass slaughter of
human beings and leaves open the question of whether humanitarian intervention
might not be justified in other circumstances, for example, involving apartheid or
the systematic denial of human rights other than the right to life.

3. Humanitarian intervention has been defined as:
[Tlhe justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another State from
treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the
sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.

E.

STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW

348 (1931). Compare Rougier, La Theorie de l'Intervention

d'Humanite, 17 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 468, 472 (1910).
4. Lauterpacht defines the term intervention as "dictatorial interference by a State [or group of
States] in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual conditions of
things." I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). Although the
term dictatorial interference does not necessarily require the actual use or threat of armed force, this
article is primarily concerned with armed intervention.
5. Convention on Genocide, supra note I. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 301 (1963);
Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville,reprinted in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AND THE UNITED NATIONS 149, 151 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Franck & Rodley, After
Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 278
(1973); infra notes II & 125.
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THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Whatever one might argue about the contemporary validity of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, there is no question that during the nineteenth and
early twentieth century the doctrine had gained widespread acceptance as a
customary principle of international law. The origins of the doctrine can be traced
to the inception of the modem period and finds its support in the writings of such
classical theorists as Grotius8 and Vattel. 9 But it was not until the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries that a substantial body of state practice arose in
which the great powers justified their forceful interventions abroad by alleging a
need to protect individuals and groups of individuals against their own states. 0
8.
There is also another question, whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the
purpose of defending them from injuries inflicted by their ruler. Certainly is is undoubted that
ever since civil societies were formed, the rulers of each claimed some special right over his
own subjects ....
But if a tyrant ... practices atrocities towards his subjects which no just
man can approve, the right of human social connection is not cut off in such a case.

H. GRoTIus, 2 DE

JURE BELLI EST PACIS, ch.

XXV, at 438 (Whewell transl. 1853).

9.
[Ilf the prince attacking the fundamental laws, gives his people a legitimate reason to resist
him, if tyranny becomes so unbearable as to cause the Nation to rise, any foreign power is
entitled to help an oppressed people that has requested its assistance.

E. DE

VArEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, ch. IV, § 56 (Pradier-Fodere ed. 1863).
10. Most significant among these interventions were those carried out by European powers to
protect Christian minorities from atrocities committed by Turkey. The Greek intervention of 1829, the
Syrian intervention of 1860, the Cretan intervention of 1866, the Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgarian
intervention from 1876 to 1878, and the various Macedonian interventions just prior to World War I,
all involved the invocation of humanitarian grounds by the intervening powers as justification. The
majority of jurists consider that at least some, if not all, of these cases constitute legitimate examples
of humanitarian intervention. See e.g., Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
by Armed Force: A Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157, 160-63 (1978); Fonteyne, The Customary
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N.
Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 207-13 (1974); Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15
MCGILL L.J. 205, 209-10 (1969); McDougal & Reisman, Communications, 3 INT'L LAWYER 438,
441-42 (1969); Reisman with McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the ibos, reprinted in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 179-83 (R. Lillich ed. 1973);
Somarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, II GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45,
57-58 (1981). A minority view, however, maintains that because most of these interventions were
based on treaty provisions authorizing the European powers to intervene militarily in the states of the
Ottoman Empire to protect Christian minorities from atrocities, they do not support recognition of a
broad right to humanitarian intervention. See 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 342; Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217, 220-21 (J. Moore ed.
1974); M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (1962). Compare N.
RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON

GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 89-91 (1985) (describing some of the interventions in the Ottoman empire
as based on grounds of humanity and others as based on treaty provisions). In his analysis of the texts
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This record of state practice persuaded a majority of those writing during that
period to assert the legal validity of intervention on grounds of humanity."
Borchard made perhaps what was the clearest statement of the doctrine when he
wrote:
[W]here a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own
citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the
of the relevant treaties, Fonteyne discovered that they did not, in fact, authorize armed intervention to
enforce their provisions. See Fonteyne, supra, at 207-13. Moreover, as Somarajah points out, an
examination of state practice indicates that despite the invocation of treaty rights of intervention,
states nonetheless "claimed the right of intervention on humanitarian grounds, attaching primacy to
that principle over their treaty rights as the justification for the intervention." Somarajah, supra,
at 57.
While the notorious cases in Eastern Europe consitute the most important examples of state
practice involving humanitarian intervention, also deserving of mention are the United States' interventions in Barbary in 1858 and Cuba in 1898, see Reisman with McDougal, supra, at 182-83, and
the many protestations against the cruel treatment of political prisoners in Morocco in the beginning
of the twentieth century, see Fonteyne, supra, at 206, and against atrocities committed on the Jews of
Russia and Rumania, see McDougal & Reisman, supra, at 441-42. The latter cases involving
protestations, however, are unpersuasive as evidence of state practice since they did not involve "the
highly coercive character of an armed intervention." Fonteyne, supra, at 206. And while the Cuban
intervention was justified by President McKinley as in "the cause of humanity and to put an end to the
barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there," and is certainly relevant, most contemporary writers view the prevailing American motive as having been the pursuit of
long standing economic and political interests. Bogen, The Law of Humanitarian Intervention:
United States Policy in Cuba (1898) and in the DominicanRepublic (1965), 7 HARV. INT'L L. CLUB J.
296, 297 (1966). Nevertheless, on the whole, the many cases during the nineteenth and early
twentieth century in which states invoked humanitarian grounds to justify forceful intervention abroad
constitutes sufficient evidence of state practice to permit recognition of the right of humanitarian
intervention as a rule of customary international law.
11. Among those in this group were such noted authorities as Wheaton, see H. WHEATON,
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (8th ed. R. Dane 1866), Woolsey, see T. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1876), Hall, see W. HALL, A TREATISE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (2d ed. 1884), Fiore, see P. FIORE, I NOVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 521-22 (Antoine trans. 1885), de Lapradelle, see de Lapradelle, Chronique sur les Affaires de
Cuba, I REVUE DE DROrr PUBLIQUE ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 75

(1900), Manning, see W. MANNING, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 97 (rev. ed. S.
1875), and Oppenheim, see L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (1st ed. 1905).

Amos

For an excellent summary of the traditional works on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention see
Oppenheim, supra, at 214-26. Although not all authors of this period supported a right to intervene
on humanitarian grounds, many of those that did not, strongly affirmed the morality of such action.
For example, Lawrence wrote that:
There is a great difference between declaring a national act to be legal, and therefore part of
the order under which states have consented to live, and allowing it to be morally blameless as
an exception to ordinary rules . . . . An intervention to put a stop to barbarous and abominable cruelty is "a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of law." It is destitute of
technical legality, but it may be morally right and even praiseworthy to a high degree.

T. LAWRENCE,

(4th ed. 1910). Accord, M. BERNARD,
33-34 (1860); W. HARCOURT (HISTORICUs), LETTERS
LAW 14 (1863); W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL

THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 129

ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
ON SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
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family of nations are authorized by international law to intervene on grounds of
humanity. 12

Those who asserted a right of humanitarian intervention in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, however, did so at a time when the use of armed
force was widely regarded by the international community as a lawful means of
dispute resolution. 3 It was not until the period between the two world wars, with
the entry into force of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the KellogBriand Pact, that the "civilized" nations of the world endeavored to outlaw war
for all time.14 In light of the considerable freedom enjoyed by states to resort to
armed force during the period, it is not surprising that the humanitarian intervention doctrine gained widespread acceptance. Those who resisted the doctrine did
so not because they believed that international law always prohibited the first use
of force, but rather because they thought that use of force based on humanitarian
grounds violated the non-intervention principle. Believing that strict principles of
sovereignty dictated that a state could treat its own nationals essentially as it saw
fit,' 5 these writers concluded that humanitarian intervention constituted impermissable interference in the internal affairs of the target state.' 6

344 (8th ed. P. Higgins 1924). The sympathy in favor of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was such that, by 1946, Sir Hartley Shawcross, felt able to declare at the Nuremburg trials that:
LAW

[T]he rights of humanitarian intervention, on behalf of the rights of man trampled upon by a
state in a manner shocking the sense of mankind has long been considered to form part of the
recognized law of nations.
Quoted in A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION 374 (1956). See also Int'l L. A., The
International Protection of Human Rights by General International Law, Interim Report of the SubCommittee, International Committee on Human Rights I1 (The Hague 1970) ("the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention seems to have been so clearly established under customary international
law that only its limits and not its existence is subject to debate.").
12. E.

BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD

14 (1915).

13. See N. RONZITTI supra note 10, at 89-90.
14. Despite the prohibition on war, many scholars contined to assert that "the theory of humanitarian intervention had been assimilated by customary international law." Fonteyne, supra note 10, at
224-25. See e.g., E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (1921); Rougier, supra
note 3, at 472; H. MOSLER, DIE INTERVENTION IM VOLKKERRECHT 63 (1937); Mandelstam, La
Protection des Minorites, I RECUEIL DES COURS 369, 391 (1923).
15. See Lane, Mass Killings By Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order? 12 INT'L L. &
POL. 239, 252 (1979).

16. Pradier-Fodere offers a classic statement of the non-intervention rationale for rejecting a right to
humanitarian intervention when he writes:
The acts of inhumanity, however condemnable they may be, do not provide the latter with a
basis for lawful intervention, as no state can stand up in judgment of the conduct of others. As
long as they do not infringe upon the rights of the other powers or of their subjects, they
remain the sole business of the nationals of the countries where they are committed.
I P.

PRADIERE-FODERE,

TRAIT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EUROPEAN

ET AMERICAIN

655 (1885)

quoted in Fonteyne supra note 10, at 216. Fonteyne also identifies Mamiani, Camazza-Amarie,
Heffter, Pereira, and Halleck as belonging to the rigid non-interventionist school. Id., at 215-18.
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In the modem world, the legal principles that guided the early evolution of the
humanitarian intervention doctrine are no longer valid. Since the ratification of
the United Nations Charter, prohibition of the use of force has become a peremptory norm of international law. Moreover, protection of human rights has been
elevated to an international concern and is no longer considered a matter solely
within the domestic jurisdiction of the individual states." While the traditional
doctrine of humanitarian intervention developed primarily as an exception to the
general principle prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of states, the
current validity of the doctrine depends on its having developed as an exception
to the general principle prohibiting the use of force. The customary doctrine,
therefore, has only marginal relevance today unless the United Nations Charter
fails to prohibit absolutely the use of force or the practice of states in the post-war
world has created a legally cognizable exception to the Charter prohibition.
II.

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE DOCTRINE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 8
The majority of scholars who have analyzed the article 2(4) prohibition on the
use of force would agree with the absolutist interpretation posited by Sir
Humphrey Waldock when he writes:
[Alrticle 2(4) prohibits entirely any threat or use of force between independent
states except in individual or collective self-defense under article 51 or in execution
of collective measures under the Charter for maintaining or restoring peace.' 9
Not only is there widespread agreement among scholars on the absolutist interpretation of article 2(4),20 but the prevailing view of the member states of the
United Nations, as exemplified in General Assembly resolutions, also strongly

17. See infra notes 159.
18. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
19. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in InternationalLaw, 81
RECUEIL DEs COURS 455, 493 (1952).

20. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 342; L.

HENKIN,

How

NATIONS BEHAVE

141 (2d ed.

1979); P. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169-70 (1948); Hassan, Realpolitik in International
Law: After Tanzanian Conflict "HumanitarianIntervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
859, 883 & n. 167 (noting that no scholars of the Third-World countries have pronounced their

concurrence with the view that article 2(4) allows for exceptions to the prohibition on the use of
force); Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 276; and Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed

Force, 82

MICH.

L. REV. 1620, 1633 (1984).
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supports the view that the Charter prohibits all unilateral uses of force except in
self-defense. 2
There are, nevertheless, a growing minority of writers who argue that because
"humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to
the political independence of the state involved," it is inaccurate to conclude that
it is precluded by article 2(4).22 This analysis contradicts both the plain meaning
of article 2(4)'s language and the intent of its drafters to prohibit absolutely the
use of force except in self-defense.
In order to interpret article 2(4) as allowing an exception to the use of force for
humanitarian intervention, it is necessary to argue that where the purpose of the
intervention is neither to impair territorial integrity nor to challenge political
independence then there is no violation of the article. The language of article
2(4), however, prohibits all uses of force "against the territorial integrity or
political independence of a state," and makes no exception for use of force when
there is no evil purpose to violate territorial integrity or political independence.
What matters is not the purpose of the violation, but the act of violating itself. An
armed intervention, even if undertaken for the purpose of protecting human
rights, violates the very essence of territorial integrity and, since it would necessarily require a change in authority structures to assure respect for human rights,
would also be against the political independence of the target state. 23
Not only does an interpretation of the Charter which allows for humanitarian
intervention contradict the clear language of article 2(4), but it also fails to take
note of the fact that it was the unabashed intent of the framers to assure that there
would be no exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force other than for selfdefense. 24 Indeed, none of those advocating a restrictive interpretationof article
2(4) have even attempted to answer the persuasive evidence put forth that the
territorial integrity and political independence language of the article was
intended to strengthen, rather than weaken, the prohibition on the use of force. 25

21. See infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
22. Reisman with McDougal supra note 10, at 177. Accord, J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD
ORDER 98-101 (1958); Lillich, supra note 10, at 212; Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in
Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 250, 262 (1969); Thapa, HumanitarianIntervention 13 (1968)
(unpublished thesis at McGill University Law School Library).
23. See, e.g., Akehurst, HumanitarianIntervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS (H.
Bull ed. 1984) (reference to territorial integrity in article 2(4) meant "territorial inviolability," which
is violated by even a temporary humanitarian intervention); Behuniak, supra note 10, at 184; 1.
BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 222; Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 255; Hassan, supra note 20, at 887;
Suzuki, A State's ProvisionalCompetence to Protect Human Rights in a Foreign State, 15 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 231, 240 (1980).
24. See L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 141.
25. See Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 242-44 (citing and agreeing with Giraud and Wenberg that
territorial integrity and political independence language intended to strengthen prohibition on use of
force). See also Clark, HumanitarianIntervention: Help to Your Friends and State Practice, 13 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 211, 211 (1983).
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Ultimately, it is difficult to escape the conclusion of Brownlie and others that it is
"extremely doubtful" whether humanitarian intervention survived the "general
26
prohibition of resort to force to be found in the U.N. Charter."
III.

THE POST-CHARTER DOCTRINE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Because it seems clear that the United Nations Charter, as it was originally
conceived, intended a blanket prohibition of the use of force, any argument for
an exception to that principle must be based on state practice after enactment of
the Charter. One area where such an exception seems to be well established is
that of the use of force to protect nationals abroad.
A. HumanitarianIntervention to Rescue Nationals Abroad
While the principle of non-intervention traditionally gave states wide discretion to treat its own nationals as it chose, that principle did not give nations an
unqualified right to abuse aliens within their borders. 27 Thus, Judge Lauterpacht
noted the paradox that "the individual in his capacity as an alien enjoys a larger
measure of protection by international law than in his character as a citizen of his
own State." 28 When another state violated the minimum standard of treatment
accorded to aliens, traditional international law sanctioned the use of forcible
self-help by the state of the nationality to protect the lives and property of its
29
nationals abroad.
Despite the Charter's prohibition on the use of force, the vast majority of
jurists continue to affirm the right of a state to use armed force for the protection
of its citizens suffering injuries within the territory of another state.30 Indeed,
with the exceptions of Brownlie3' and Ronzitti,3 2 most authors who affirm the
absolute interpretation of article 2(4) also support the legal validity of the doc26. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 342. See also A. Thomas & A. Thomas, The Dominican
Republic Crisis 1965, at 20 (Hammarskjold Forum 1967) ("In spite of a recognition of a right of
humanitarian intervention by customary international law, strict principles of modem multilateral
treaty law may have completely abolished the right.").
27. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv. 325,
326-27 (1967). See also Suzuki, supra note 23, at 241-42.
28. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 121 (1950).
29. See, e.g., Borchard, supra note 12, at 346-47; F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 19
(1932); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW Section 202, at 647 (2d rev. ed. 1945); P. JESSUP, supra
note 20, at 169; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 300.
30. See e.g., D. BoWETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (1958); L. McNAIR, THE
LAW OF TREATIES 209-10 (1961); VAN PANHYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 113-14 (1959); Lillich supra note 10, at 216; Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965
Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order -UN Part 1, 43 DENVER L.J. 439, 460 (1966).
31. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 301.
32. N. RONZrrTI, supra note 10, at 64.
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trine allowing for the rescue of nationals abroad through military coercion.33 The
rescue doctrine finds abundant support in the practice of states during the postCharter era. The necessity of protecting the lives of nationals abroad has been
invoked as a justification by the United States in the Lebanon intervention of
1958,1 4 the Dominican operation in 1965, 35 the Mayaguez incident, 36 the hostage
rescue mission in Iran,3 7 and the Grenada invasion; 38 by the United Kingdom in
the threatened intervention in Iran in 1951 and in the Suez crisis in 1956;19 by
Belgium in the Congo operations of 1960 and 1964;40 by Egypt in its raid on
Lamaca in 1978 ' and in the rescue attempt on Malta in 1986; and finally by Israel
in its raid on Entebbe in 1976.42 While it is true that a number of these interventions were severely criticized by a great number of countries, such criticism was
primarily directed at the failure of the rescue mission to meet the strict requirements of necessity and proportionality, and not at the legality of the rescue
43
doctrine as such.
Attempts to justify the rescue doctrine as a species of self-defense explicitly
authorized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter are ultimately unavailing.4

33. See, e.g., P. JEssup, supra note 20 at 170-71; A. Thomas & A. Thomas, supra note 26, at 19;
Schachter, supra note 20, at 1629-30; Waldock, supra note 19, at 457 ("But, if the United Nations is
not in a position to move in time and the need for instant action is manifest, it would be difficult to
deny the legitimacy of action in defense of nationals which every responsible government would feel
bound to take, if it had the means to do so.").
34. See, e.g., Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959);
Nanda, supra note 30, at 451.
35. See, e.g., A. Thomas & A. Thomas, supra note 26; Bogen, supra note 10; Nanda, supra note
30.
36. See, e.g., Behuniak, The Seizure and Recovery of the S.S. Mayaguez: A Legal Analysis of the
United States Claims, 82 MIL. L. REV. 157 (1978); Friedlander, The Mayaguez in Retrospect:
HumanitarianIntervention or Showing the Flag?, 22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 601 (1978); Paust, The Seizure
and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Note, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue Mission to
Iran and its Legality UnderInternationalLaw, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485 (1981); Stein, Comtempt, Crisis
and the Court: The World Court and the Hostage Rescue Attempt, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 499 (1982);
Comment, The American Hostages in Tehran: The I.C.J. and the Legality of Rescue Missions 30
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 717 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada:Reflections on the Lawfulness of
Invsion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); Moore, Grenadaand the InternationalDouble Standard, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984).
39. See, e.g., N. RONZrrTtI, supra note 10, at 26-27, 28-30.
40. See, e.g., Note, The Congo Crisis1964: A Case Study in HumanitarianIntervention, 12 VA. J.
INT'L L. 261 (1972); N. RONZITrI, supra note 10, at 30-32.
41. See N. RoNzrrrl, supra note 10, at 40-41.
42. See, e.g., Green, Rescue at Entebbe-Legal Aspects, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 312
(1976); Krift, Self-Defense and Self-Help: The Israeli Raid on Entebbe, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 43
(1977); Note, Use of Forcefor the Protection ofNationalsAbroad: The Entebbe Incident, 9 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 117 (1977).
43. See N. RONzirri, supra note 10, at 58-61, 67.
44. A number of writers have attempted to justify the lawfulness of the rescue doctrine on grounds
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The language of article 51 itself requires the occurrence of an "armed attack"
against the state itself before a state can exercise its inherent right of selfdefense. 45 But the argument that a threat to the safety of nationals abroad constitutes an armed attack upon the state itself requires a leap of logic that would
justify a vastly disproportionate response by the state invoking its supposed right
of self-defense. 46 Moreover, the self-defense justification for the rescue doctrine
fails to explain those instances where states have used force where no attack on
nationals has occurred but they are in imminent danger (i.e., the Dominican
Operation), and where the state upon whose territory the rescue occurs is not
responsible for the attack (i.e., the Egyptian raid on Larnaca and the Israeli raid
on Entebbe). 47 Equally unpersuasive is the attempt to distinguish such rescue
operations from humanitarian interventions on the grounds that the former are
only temporary and seek no change in authority structures and, therefore, do not
violate the territorial integrity or political independence of the target state. 48 The
absolute prohibition on the use of force embodied in article 2(4) leaves no room
for fine distinctions based on manipulations of the territorial integrity and political independence concepts, which were intended to strengthen, rather than
weaken, the ban on the use of force. 49 Moreover, while it is possible to conceive
of a temporary, surgical rescue mission that does not threaten political independence, such an uninvited use of force would, by definition, impair the territorial
integrity of the invaded state.
Because the Charter provisions themselves provide no legal basis for the
rescue doctrine, its current validity depends on the theory that state practice itself
has given rise to a new customary rule which has modified the Charter prohibition on the use of force. Widespread recognition of the legality of the rescue
doctrine by the legal community is especially significant in that it reflects the
realization, confirmed by experience, that no state with the capability to act will

of self-defense. See D. BowETT, supra note 30, at 91, 93-95; A. Thomas & A. Thomas, supra note
26, at 14; Waldock, supra note 19, at 467.
45. N. Ronzitti, supra note 10, at 69.
46. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 298-301, 429; N. RoNzr-r-i, supra note 10, at 69; Fairley,
State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: Reopening Pandora's Box, 10 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 42-43 (1980); Hassan, supra note 20, at 888.

47. N. RONZITTI supra note 10, at 69.
48. See Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 283, (noting a factual distinction between the two cases,
though not a legal one). For the theory that rescue of nationals abroad does not violate article 2(4), see
Restatement Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) Tentative Draft section 703,
Reporters Notes No. 8 (April 12, 1985); D. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 328 (1965); A.
Thomas & A. Thomas, supra note 26, at 14-15.
49. "The theory according to which the use of force for the protection of nationals abroad is
lawful, since it infringes neither on the territorial integrity nor on the political independence of the
States is by now, as has been stated, 'discredited.' The terms 'territorial integrity' and 'political
independence' merely stand for 'territorial inviolability."' N. RoNzrrrn, supra note 10, at 8 (citations
omitted). See also notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
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allow its own nationals to be killed or injured abroad. 50 If, in fact, as a result of
post-Charter state practice, the right to rescue nationals abroad has emerged as a
new customary rule of international law, then there seems no logical reason why
state practice could not equally elevate the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
to such status. The challenge for international scholars is to discover whether or
not, as a result of state practice and the compelling necessity of preventing mass
slaughter, that has already happened.
B. State Practice and HumanitarianIntervention To Prevent Mass
Slaughter
1. HumanitarianIntervention Generally
While this article does not purport to argue that humanitarian intervention in
contexts other than genocide is legally justifiable, there are a number of cases in
the post-War era where states have invoked humanitarian grounds not amounting
to genocide in order to justify their interventions. Examples of such interventions
constitute relevant state practice insofar as the case for humanitarian intervention
is far more compelling when the mass slaughter of human beings is at stake.
a. The Congo Crisis
In the fall of 1964, rebel forces in the Congo seized several thousand innocent
persons and held them hostage in order to obtain concessions from the recognized government. After thirty-five of the hostages had been slaughtered and the
rebel leader had threatened that if his demands were not met, "we will dress
ourselves with the skins of the Americans and Belgians," 51a joint rescue operation was staged using United States planes to transport Belgian paratroopers from
British bases. In a four-day period, two thousand people of over eighteen na-

50. Lillich, supra note 27, at 345. Even Fairley who comes out strongly against both the rescue
doctrine and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention admits the necessity of action in cases such as
Entebbe. He quotes with approval the statement of Israel's United Nations Ambassador Herzog that
"[tihere is also a moral law, and by all that is moral on this earth Israel had the right to do what it did.
Indeed, it had also the duty to do so." Fairley, supra note 46, at 59.
51. 52 Dep't of State Bull. 18 (1965).
52. The Department of State issued the following statement in defense of the operation:
This operation is humanitarian-not military. It is designed to avoid bloodshed-not to
engage the rebel forces in combat. Its purpose is to accomplish its task quickly and withdraw-not to seize or hold territory. Personnel engaged are under orders to use force only in
their own defense or in the defense of the foreign and Congolese civilians. They will depart
from the scene as soon as their evacuation mission is accomplished.
51 Dep't State Bull. 842 (1964). Additionally, in the United Nations, Ambassador Stevenson stated
that, "[w]hile our primary obligation was to protect the lives of American citizens, we are proud that
the mission rescued so many innocent people of 18 other nationalities from their dreadful predicament." 52 Dep't State Bull. 17 (1965).
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tionalities were rescued. The mission had been undertaken with the consent of
the central Congo government and only after peaceful efforts to secure the
release of the hostages had proved unavailing.
The United States justified its participation in the intervention as humanitarian
and in order to save the lives of foreign and Congolese citizens, as well as its
own. 52 In the subsequent debates at the United Nations, Italy, Norway, France,
Nationalist China, Brazil, and Bolivia, in addition to the participating powers,
endorsed the use of force in this instance based, in large part, on the human3
itarian exigencies.A
Moreover, the Security Council failed to take any action condemning the
Congo operation. 54 Of those nations that did condemn the mission, only three
rejected the concept of humanitarian intervention while all the others were content to argue that the intervention was not, in fact, humanitarian in nature. 5
Despite one writer's opinion that "if ever there was a case for the use of
forcible self help to protect lives, the Congo rescue was it,"'5 6 some authors
contend that the Congo action is a poor precedent for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.57 The argument is essentially that the Congo intervention
derives its legitimacy from the invitation of the Congo government and from the
fact that the purpose of the mission was to rescue nationals. With regard to the
argument based on consent, the invitation was somewhat problematic since there
was considerable doubt whether the central government was in effective control
of the country at the time.58 Moreover, the intervening nations invoked the humanitarian argument as sufficient in and of itself to justify the operation. 59 On the
other hand, the fact that the Congo action was undertaken to protect nationals
does substantially weaken its precedential value as a purely humanitarian intervention. It is relevant, nevertheless, since the United States justified its action, at
least in part, as a humanitarian intervention to protect the lives of citizens of the
Congo and other foreign countries, as well as its own.

53. See 19 U.N. SCOR, (1173rd mtg.) at 3, U.N. Dc. S/PV. 1173 (1964) (Belgium); 19 U.N.
SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1174 (1964) (United States); 19 U.N. SCOR (1175th
mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1175 (1964) (United Kingdom); 19 U.N. SCOR (1177th mtg.) at 19-20,
U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1177 (1964) (Brazil); 19 U.N. SCOR (1177th mtg.) at 26, U.N. Doc. S/PV.
1177(1964) Nationalist China); 19 U.N. SCOR (1183rd mtg.) at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1183 (1964)
(Bolivia); 19 U.N. SCOR (I176th mtg.) at 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/PV. (1964) (France); 2 U.N. Monthly
Chronicle 11-20 (No. 1,1965).
54. 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 328 U.N.Doc.S/Res 129 (1964); Nanda, supra note
30, at 477.
55. 19 U.N. SCOR (I170th mtg.) at 23. U.N. Doc. S/PU. 1170 (1964) (Ghana); 19 U.N. SCOR
(1174th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1174 (1964) (United Arab Republic).
56. Lillich, supra note 27, at 340.
57. See i. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 221; Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 287-88.
58. See Somarajah, supra note 10, at 71.
59. Note, supra note 40, at 271 (noting that both the United States and Belgium "suggested that in
the protection of human rights a request is not a sine qua non to forceful intervention").
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b. The Dominican Intervention
In late April 1965, anti-rebel police and military authorities of the Dominican
Republic informed the United States embassy that because of the complete breakdown of law and order in that country, they could no longer assure the safety of
American lives. Subsequently, the United States landed a marine force in the
Dominican Republic, justifying its action on the need "to protect the lives of
Americans and the nationals of other countries in the face of increasing violence
and disorder. ' 6° Countries allied with the United States including England,
France, the Netherlands, Nationalist China, and Costa Rica supported the Dominican action on humanitarian grounds. 6' Moreover, despite the fact that there is
a strong argument to be made that the intervention violated the strict provisions of
the Charter of the Organization of American States, 62 the OAS itself not only
passed a resolution endorsing the United States actions, but actually replaced the
63
American marines with its own peace-keeping force.
The United States, nevertheless, came under considerable criticism both from
communist countries and congressional leaders for its operation in the Dominican Republic.64 But this attack, which has been joined by a number of international legal scholars, has been primarily leveled at the purity of United States
motives given the failure of the American marine force to make a hasty exit from
the island. 65 Whether or not greater geo-political considerations ultimately tainted
the Dominican action, the vast majority of writers accept that, at least in its initial
stages, the American military intervention was justified on humanitarian
grounds. 66
c. The Grenada Invasion
On October 25, 1983, United States military forces invaded Grenada, ostensibly to save the lives of American nationals endangered by the revolutionary state
of affairs then existing on the island. Although the mission resulted in the
successful rescue of the 1,100 United States citizens resident on Grenada, the
United Nations General Assembly bitterly condemned the United States' action
60. Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson inN.Y. Times, May 1,1965, at 6, col. 4 quoted in
Lillich, supra note 10, at 341.
61. N. RoNzrrr,, supra note 10, at 34.
62. Lillich, supra note 10, at 215. See also Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the
Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L. REV., 1147, 1171-75 (1967) (arguing that rule of non-intervention in the Inter-American system has undergone a "profound metamorphosis" as result of OAS
approval of the Dominican operation).
63. Cabrames, supra note 62, at 1174-1175.
64. See Nanda, supra note 30, at 464, 469.
65. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 20, at 1630. See also Nanda, supra note 30, at 469 (citing
criticism of Senators Fulbright and Morse to the effect that Dominican action violated the proportionality principle).
66. See, e.g., Behuniak, supra note 10, at 174; Lillich, supra note 10, at 214-15; Nanda, supra
note 30, at 471-72.
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as a violation of international law by a larger majority than its similar condemna67
tion of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The Grenada action is decidedly not a good precedent for the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. Indeed, unlike the operations in the Congo and the
Dominican Republic, the United States sought to justify its behavior on the
narrow grounds of protection of nationals abroad and specifically declined to
invoke the broader doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 68 The action of the
General Assembly, however, should not be taken as evidence of state practice
rejecting either the rescue doctrine or the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
Criticism of the Grenada mission was primarily directed at the failure to show a
genuine and imminent threat to the lives of American nationals, the failure to
exhaust peaceful means, and the disproportionality of the military response. 69
Thus, such criticism establishes only that a rescue mission or a humanitarian
intervention must meet strictly applied procedural and substantive criteria. It
does not establish rejection of the humanitarian intervention doctrine per se.
2. HumanitarianIntervention To Prevent Genocide
The Congo and Dominican precedents are significant in that the intervening
states invoked humanitarian grounds to justify what would otherwise have been a
violation of article 2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force. But because these
examples involved primarily the protection of foreign nationals rather than citizens of the target state, they could not by themselves establish a right of humanitarian intervention. It was not until the invasions of Bangladesh by India and of
Uganda by Tanzania that sufficient state practice had emerged to revive the
customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
a. The Bangladesh Crisis
In an attempt to quell protests, riots and demonstrations by groups seeking
autonomy for East Pakistan, the Pakistan army moved into Dacca in March 1971.
Within days, the army had launched a reign of teror, in which 10,000 East
Bengalis were killed and a massive refugee movement to India began. To remedy
the gross human rights violations inflicted upon the people of East Bengal by the
Pakistan army and to stem the resulting endless flood of refugees across its
borders, India, in December 1971, conducted an armed intervention into East
Pakistan. In less than one week, the Pakistani army had surrendered, the widespread deprivation of human rights had come to an end, and a new state had been
created in Bangladesh.

67. See Moore, supra note 38, at 153.
68. Robinson, Letterfrom the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, 18 INT'L LAWYER
381, 386 ("We did not assert a broad doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention.' We relied instead on the
narrower, well-established ground of protection of United States nationals.").
69. See Joyner, supra note 38, at 135; Schachter, supra note 20, at 1632.
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While India justified its behavior as a lawful exercise of the right of selfdefense in response to Pakistani air strikes just before the invasion, it also made
recourse to a humanitarian argument. Before the United Nations Security Council, for example, the Indian delegate declared that "we have on this particular
occasion nothing but the purest motives and purest of intentions: to rescue the
people of East Bengal from what they are suffering." 70 In the face of overwhelming atrocities committed by the government of Pakistan in Bangladesh, the world
community was noticeably reluctant to condemn India's actions. At the General
Assembly debates, only two states, China and Albania, branded India as an
aggressor, while Bhutan, the Soviet Union, and many Eastern-bloc states defended India by emphasizing the intolerable rights situation in East Bengal. 7' The
United States, for its part, opposed the use of force and urged that a political
solution be found to the crisis. 72 Ultimately, the Security Council failed to pass
any resolution condemning the Indian intervention, and the General Assembly
did no more than urge a domestic political solution and that India not violate the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. 73 At least one jurist maintains
that this "absence of condemnation of the Indian intervention by the international
community amounts to a condonation of intervention" to prevent mass atrocities
74
against a minority.
The majority of jurists who have written on the Bangladesh crisis regard
India's actions, preventing the massacre of the population of East Bengal, as
justifiable under international law. 75 Even those authors who maintain the action
70. Quoted in Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 276. The Indian delegate also went on to state:
I wish ... to give a very serious warning to the Council that we shall not be a party to any
solution that will mean continuation of oppression of East Pakistan people, whatever the
pretext, whatever the ground on which this is brought about. So long as we have any light of
civilized behavior left in us, we shall protect them.
Quoted in N. RoNz-rI, supra note 10, at 96. While it is true that the humanitarian argument was not
India's first line of defense, these statements rebut the assertions of those authors who claim that India
did not attempt to justify its intervention on humanitarian grounds. See Fonteyne, supra note 10, at
204; Flinterman, HumanitarianIntervention, 26 CHrrTY's L.J. 284, 285 (1978); Hassan, supra note
20, at884 n.167, 886 n.172.

71. N.RONzIrr, supra note 10, at97.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Somarajah, supra note 10, at 73.
75. See, e.g., Behuniak, supra note 10, at 176; Fonteyne, supra, note 10, at 204 ("(India's] course
of action in the Bangladesh situation probably constitutes the clearest case of forceful individual
humanitarian intervention in this century."); Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention: A Reply, in LAW
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD

230 (J. Moore ed 1974); Somarajah, supra note 10, at

71-73 (India's action meets all criteria for lawful humanitarian intervention including the failure of
U.N. enforcement machinery, exhaustion of peaceful means, a nexus with the repressed people, and a
minumum interference in the affairs of the target country); J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS
BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND HUMAN HOPES 14-17 (1974); see e.g., Farer, supra note 7, at 158;
Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 276; Friedman, Comment, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 579 (J.
Moore ed. 1974).
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was illegal, admit that the intervention was morally condonable to prevent genocide. 76 Despite the argument of certain other publicists that India's motivation
was based not on altruistic grounds but on its own national interest, 77 one must
ultimately agree with no less an authority than the International Committee of
Jurists when they state:
In our view the circumstances were wholly exceptional, it was becoming more and
more urgent to find a solution, both for humanitarian reasons and because [of] the
refugee burden . . .Events having been allowed to reach this point, it is difficult to
see what other choice India could have made ...
In conclusion, therefore, we consider that India's armed intervention would have
been justified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. . .We also consider
that the degree of force used was no greater
than was necessary in order to bring to
78
an end these violations of human rights.
b. The Invasion of Uganda.
The barbaric cruelties perpetrated upon the people of Uganda by President Udi
Amin are well documented. In eight years of repressive rule the Amin regime was
responsible for the murder and torture of approximately 300,000 people. Nearly
two months after an armed incursion by Uganda into Tanzanian territory, Tanzania's armed forces invaded Uganda in late January 1979. Despite the fact that
Ugandan troops had returned permanently to within their borders many weeks
before, Tanzania initially made the incredible claim that it was acting in selfdefense.79 By April 11, Tanzania's armed forces together with Ugandan rebel
groups occupied the Ugandan capital and ousted Amin. The Tanzanian troops
remained in Uganda long enough for a new government to take power and for
normalcy to be restored.
Although Tanzania defended its action mainly on grounds of self-defense, it
eventually did reveal an underlying humanitarian motive. The Tanzanian foreign
minister declared that the fall of Amin was "a tremendous victory for the people
of Uganda and a singular triumph for freedom, justice and human dignity."80
Moreover, Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere stated that it was necessary to
"punish" Amin for the aggression he had committed against Tanzania and the

76. See, e.g., Farer, supra note 7, at 158; Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 276; Friedman, supra
note 75, at 579.
77. See Hassan, supra note 20, at 884 n. 167; Friedman, supra note 75, at 577.

78. East Pakistan Staff Study, 8 THE

REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS,

23, 62 (1972).
79. N. RONZITTI, supra note 10, at 102.

80. Quoted in id., at 103. See also Furley, Uganda's Retreatfrom Turmoil, 196 CONFLICT STUDIES
6 (1987) (Nyerere "considered it a humanitarian duty to 'liberate' Uganda from the tyrant"). Tanzania, however, initially denied that it had a legal right to overthrow Amin: "Tanzania has no right to
enter Uganda in order to topple Amin .... The people of Uganda have that right." (quoting Nyerere)
Xl AFRICAN CONTEMPORARY RECORD B431 (1979).
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genocide he had committed against his own people." Tanzania's pleas that its
actions were justified by "the Uganda army's aggression against Tanzania" are
ultimately unpersuasive.8 2 As an act of either self-defense or reprisal, the invasion of Uganda was a grossly disproportionate response. Moreover, Tanzania
could not hope to establish the requisite necessity and the legitimacy of reprisals
under international law is extremely questionable at best.83 In the final analysis, if
one is going to accept the legality of Tanzania's behavior, it is impossible to avoid
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
As a matter of fact, the entire world community tacitly did accept the legality
of Tanzania's actions. The Tanzanian invasion received no negative reaction from
the world community whatsoever.8 4 The United Nations did not even debate the
issue and the Organization of African Unity did not censure the intervention with
only two nations, Nigeria and Sudan, dissenting. 85 Moreover, by recognizing the
new government almost without hesitation, the vast majority of nations seemed to
86
approve quietly the turn of events in Uganda.
As with the case of the Indian intervention in Bangladesh, most commentators
who have considered the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda have concluded that it
was justifiable on humanitarian grounds. 87 Moreover, given the reaction of the
world community, these scholars concluded that the Uganda case is evidence of a
new international norm authorizing intervention on grounds of humanity.88 While
admitting that if ever humanitarian intervention was justified it was in Uganda, at
least one author concludes nevertheless that even in this case, the legal criteria
were not met. 89 The argument is based on the assumption that Tanzania's motives
were not disinterested and that Tanzania failed to cease the operation after the
humanitarian objectives had been accomplished. Although it is true that Tanzania
desired to overthrow Amin, there was clearly a humanitarian component to its
81. Hassan, supra note 20, at 866, 872-73. See also XI AFRICAN CONTEMPORARY RECORD
B394-95 (1979); N. RONzrrri, supra note 10, at 103.
82. Quoted in N. RONzrrn, supra note 10, at 105. See also XI AFRICAN CONTEMPORARY RECORD
B395-96 (1979).
83. See C. THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 119 (1985).
84. See XI AFRICAN CONTEMPORARY RECORD B397 (1979); N. RONZITTI, supra note 10, at 105;
Sornarajah, supra note 10, at 74.
85. See Hassan, supra 42, at 866; N. RONZIrrTI, supra note 10, at 104-06; C. THOMAS, supra note
104, at 111-12.
86. See N. RONzrrTIC, supra note 10 at 104; C. THOMAS, supra note 83, at 113.
87. See, e.g., Chaterjee, Some Legal Problems of Support Role in InternationalLaw: Tanzania
and Uganda, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 755, 767-68; Sornarajah, supra note 10, at 59; Suzuki, supra
note 23, at 239-40; Umozurike, Tanzania's Intervention in Uganda, 20 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS
301, 312-13 (1982).
88. See supra note 87. But see N. RONzIrnr, supra note 10 at 111- 12; C. THOMAS, supra note 83,
at 104, 120 (denying Tanzania's invasion of Uganda indicates a new rule of humanitarian intervention,
but conceding the morality of Tanzania's actions and that it may be beginning the development of an
emerging norm of international law).
89. Hassan, supra note 20, at 912.

350

GENERAL ARTICLES

actions and to expect a more honestly altruistic motive is both unnecessary and
unrealistic. 90 Finally, the continued presence of Tanzania's troops in Uganda was
essential, for without them, there could be no return to normalcy. 9' Given the
moral imperative of putting an end to Amin's cruelty, Tanzania had no choice but
to go into Uganda, and once in, Tanzania had no choice but to stay.
c. The Invasion of Kampuchea.
The murderous regime of Pol Pot in Kampuchea is surpassed only by that of
Hitler's Germany in the death and terror it inflicted on innocent human beings. In
less than three years of repressive rule, the Pol Pot regime was responsible for the
murder of between two and three million people, or more than one third of the
population of Kampuchea. The international community, although painfully
aware of the terrible suffering, took no incisive measures to prevent the continued
perpetration of atrocities in Kampuchea. Finally, on December 25, 1978, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. Within weeks, Vietnamese troops occupied the whole
of Kampuchea and replaced Pol Pot with a puppet government made up of
elements from the so-called United Front. Almost eight years later, the armies of
Vietnam continue to occupy Kampuchea.
Contrary to its response to the invasions of East Pakistan and Uganda, the
world community widely condemned Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea as a
flagrant violation of international law. The General Assembly adopted a number
of resolutions censuring the foreign intervention and calling for withdrawal of
foreign forces9 2 but, failing to condemn Vietnam as an agressor, was defeated
only by the veto of the Soviet Union. 93 In the United Nations debates, the reaction
ran closely along geo-political lines. Only the Soviet-bloc nations defended
Vietnam's actions, pointing to the inhuman conditions in Cambodia and maintaining that Pol Pot had been overthrown by the internal forces of the United
Front. 94 China and the Western states strongly criticized Vietnam's aggression in
Kampuchea. Most significantly, many of these states, along with a handful of
non-alligned countries, argued that Vietnam could not justify its use of force in
order to protect human rights in Kampuchea. 95 Vietnam, for its part, while noting

90. See C. THOMAS, supra note 83, at 116-117, 119-20. See also infra notes 104-108 and
accompanying text.
91. See C. THOMAS, supra note 83, at 117-18.
92. See N. RONZITTI, supra note 10, at 101.
93. 34 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Mar.) at 27, U.N. Doc. S/13027 (1979) (draft resolution); 34 UN
SCOR 92112th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2112 (1979) (report of vote).
94. 34 U.N. SCOR (2108th mtg.) at 2, 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV 2108 (1979) (U.S.S.R.); id., at 17, 18
(Cuba); 4 U.N. SCOR (2109th mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2109 (1979) (Czechoslovakia); id., at 8
(German Democratic Republic); id., at 9 (Hungary); 34 U.N. SCOR (2111th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/
PV. 2111 (1979) (Poland); id., at 10 (Bulgaria).
95. 34 U.N. SCOR (2108th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2108 (1979) (China); 34 U.N. SCOR
(2110th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2110 (1979) (United States); id., at 6 (United Kingdom); 34 U.N.
SCOR (2109th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2109 (1979) (France); id., at 2 (Norway); 34 U.N. SCOR
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the atrocities committed by Pol Pot, argued that he had been overthrown by the
United Front and that Vietnam's own presence was at the request of the local
resistance. 96
Despite the negative reaction of the international community, the Kampuchean
case does not constitute a negation of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
anymore than does the Grenada case constitute a rejection of the rescue doctrine.
First, unlike the cases of Bangladesh and Uganda, the Kampuchea case sparked
bitter Cold-War rivalries that shaped the reaction of the world community. Thus,
strict questions of legality could be expected to have played only a minor role in
the reaction of states. Moreover, the crucial lesson of the Kampuchea case is that
the international community will not accept the invocation of a human rights
rationale as a smokescreen for external aggression. An attempt by Vietnam to
make resort to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention would have been patently unconvincing in light of its own atrocious human rights record, blatantly
expansionist motivations, and continued hegemony over Kampuchea. 97 Finally, it
would be impossible to deny the inherent morality of a truly humanitarian rescue
mission to put an end of Pol Pot's genocide. Indeed, in the United States Senate,
George McGovern advocated a humanitarian intervention in Cambodia.98 In the
final analysis, one cannot escape the inevitable question, whether despite the
selfish motivations behind the Vietnamese invasion, are not the people of Kampuchea better off?
3. State Practice: Conclusions
Those scholars who deny that state practice supports a right of humanitarian
intervention point mainly not to the cases where the right has been exercised, but
to the cases where it has not. They argue that the failure to intervene to prevent
mass slaughter in Armenia, Nazi Germany, Rwanda and Burundi, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Kampuchea makes any right of humanitarian intervention highly
suspect. 99 While it is indeed tragic that the nations of the world have stood idly by
as ruthless regimes have massacred literally millions of fellow human beings, it is
a mistake to conclude that such inaction has undermined the validity of the

(211lth mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2111 (1979) (Nigeria); 34 U.N. SCOR (2109th mtg.) at 7, U.N.
Doc. S/PV. 2109 (1979) (Bolivia); 34 U.N. SCOR (2110th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. 2 S/PV. 2110 (1979)
(Singapore); See also Comment, Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition, 30 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 234, 235 (1981) (noting also that the Western States and ASEAN continue to recognize the Pol
Pot government); id., at 234 n.2, 235.
96. 34 U.N. SCOR (2108th mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2108 (1979) (Vietnam).
97. See Sornarajah, supra note 10, at 74.
98. See Lane, supra note 15, at 245.
99. Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 290, 293-98. See also Farer, The Regulation of Foreign
Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict, 142 RECUEIL DE COURS 291, 398-401 (1974); B. Harff,
GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 8 (Monograph
Series in World Affairs v.20 b.3 (1984)); A. Thomas & A. Thomas, supra note 11, at 373-74.
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doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In the first place, international law does
not require the constant utilization of a customary rule for it to remain valid.1°°
Given the relative shortness of the post-Charter period and the relatively few
instances of genocide in relation to other international events occurring during
that period, state practice has, in fact, been fairly substantial. Perhaps, more
importantly, however, the argument based on the failure to intervene proves only
that there is no international legal duty of humanitarian intervention. But no one
has claimed such an obligation. The argument is for a right of humanitarian
intervention and thus the relevant body of precedent concerns the reaction of the
world community when that right has been exercised.
Because states normally wish to avert their eyes even when millions are "dying
in concentration camps or under the treads of tanks," many publicists are profoundly skeptical when these same nations seek to invoke humanitarian grounds
to justify their interventions.' 0' They argue that history reveals that states will
only intervene forcefully in another state when significant economic or political
interests are at stake.0 2 Franck and Rodley thus conclude that "those waiting to
catch the crumbs of human rights from the table where the powers feast on self'0 3
interest are not likely to be well nourished."'
While is is difficult to find fault with this conclusion, it is nevertheless a
mistake to argue that because states have not been motivated by purely altruistic
concerns, there have been no genuine cases of humanitarian intervention in the
twentieth century. 104The opponents of humanitarian intervention ask too much
when they naively seek to find acts vindicating human rights based on total
disinterestedness. The unfortunate reality is that there will be a selfish political
motivation behind almost every humanitarian intervention. 105 If there are compelling humanitarian grounds for intervention, there is simply no good reason why
the presence of interests other than altruism on the part of the intervening state
should bear on the legality of the action."°6 It is enough simply that political
expediency coincides with humanitarian necessity.
The defense of protection of third persons in domestic criminal law systems
provides a useful analogy. In such systems, an actor is justified in using deadly

100. See Behuniak, supra note 10, at170; Fonteyne, supra note 10, at234.
101. Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 294.
102. Id., at 279. See also 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 223; Farer, supra note 7, at 391; Hassan,
supra note 2,at881-82.
103. Franck & Rodley, supra note 7,at290; N. RoNzrr'I, supra note 10, at92.
104. See Fairley, supra note 46, at58. See also 1.BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at223; Clark, supra
note 25, at 212-13; Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 290; N. RoNzrrrT, supra note 10, at 92.
105. See, e.g., Behuniak, supra note 10, at 187; Fonteyne, supra note 10, at261; J.SrONE, supra
note 75, at 344 (even action taken against Nazis not to prevent "abominations at home," but
"adventures abroad").
106. See Bond, Survey of Normative Rules of Intervention, 52 MIL. L. REv. 51, 63 (1971);
Fonteyne, supra note 10, at261; Lillich, supra note 27, at350; Somarajah, supra note 10, at 65,
69-70.
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force to protect third persons if, under the circumstances as the actor believes
them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such
measures.107 It matters not whether the actor has a personal stake in using deadly
force against the aggressor, so long as the circumstances justify protection of the
innocent third party. Similarly, the pertinent question in international law is not
the selfish motivation of the intervenor, but whether intervention was necessary
and narrowly tailored to prevent the mass slaughter of human beings. 0 8 Judged in
this light, the unavoidable conclusion is that state practice during the post-Charter
era has been sufficiently consistent to support revival of the right of humanitarian
intervention as a customary rule of international law.109 •
C. The CurrentDoctrine of HumanitarianIntervention
Although post-Charter state practice constitutes persuasive evidence of the
legal validity of humanitarian intervention, there is far less consistency among
the opinion of jurists and state actors on the legitimacy of the doctrine. But while
on an abstract level many object to the right of humanitarian intervention, when
faced with the concrete case in which a state uses force to prevent mass slaughter,
they seem invariably to acquiesce.
1. The Opinion of Learned Publicists
The scholarly debate on the current legal validity of humanitarian intervention
has been extremely divisive with both opponents and proponents of the doctrine
claiming clear majorities." 0 Despite the assertion of certain authors that the
doctrine has no credibility whatsoever,"' one cannot ignore the opinion of a
writer like Oppenheim when he speaks out in favor of a right to intervene on
humanitarian grounds. He writes:
[Tihere is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of the view that
there are limits to [the] discretion [of states in the treatment of their own nationals]

107. See B. HARFF, supra note 99, at 81.
108. Id., at 37, 60.
109. See, e.g., Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 643 (1984); Somarajah, supra note 10, at 59, 75; Suzuki, supra note 23, at
239-40.
110. The opinion of the leading scholars has a significant impact on the development of intemational legal norms. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, for example, provides that:
The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as
are submitted to it, shall apply: ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified
publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of
law.
I.C.J. Stat., art. 38, para. I(d). Behuniak maintains that the majority of jurists are on the side of the
humanitarian intervention doctrine. Behuniak, supra note 10, at 170.
111. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 25, at 211; Nanda, supra note 30, at 474; N. RONZirri, supra note
10, at 108.
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and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its
nationals in such a way as to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the
interest of humanity is legally permissible." 2

Oppenheim is not alone in this judgment. Among the contemporary commentators also supporting the legality of humanitarian intervention under proper
conditions are Fonteyne," 3 Jessup, 114 Lillich," ts Moore," 6 Reisman," 7 the
Thomases," 8 and many others." 9 Whether or not this group constitutes a majority, it clearly does represent a serious and substantial body of opinion in favor of
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, despite the claim that no
authors from non-Western countries have spoken out in favor of humanitarian
intervention, proponents include jurists from Asia'20 and Africa.' 2'
The contemporary opinion of learned publicists concerning the validity of
humanitarian intervention is far from unanimous. But while a highly respected
and authoritative body of literature continues to assert that the Charter prohibition
on the use of force precludes humanitarian intervention,' 22 the trend is clearly in
the opposite direction.' 23 More importantly, of those scholars who reject the

112. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 312. Cf H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 28, at 120 ff.
113. Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 258.
114. P. JEssuP, supra note 42, at 169.
115. Lillich, supra note 27, at 326.
116. Moore, supra note 22, at 263.
117. Reisman with McDougal, supra note 10, at 169.
118. A. Thomas and A. Thomas, supra note 26, at 19.
119. See, e.g., Int'l L. A., Report of the Fifty-Second Conference 759 (Helsinki 1966); Behuniak,
supra note 10, at 186, 190; Bogen, supra note 10, at 300; Goldie, The Transvaluation of Values in
Contemporary InternationalLaw, 53 IOWA L. REV. 358, 362 (1967); Korey, A Global Ombudsman,
SATURDAY REVIEW, Aug. 12, 1967, at 20; McDougal, Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, 20
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 19, 29 (1967); and notes 141-43 infra. Stone supra note 75, at 89- 101;
and infra notes 12-22.
120. See Somarajah, supra note 10, at 58-60; Suzuki, supra note 23, at 239-40; Thapa, supra
note 22. See also McDougal & Reisman, supra note 10, at 441 (citing Dean Murty, a leading Asian
scholar).
121. Adaramolo, The Nigerian Crisis and Foreign Intervention:A Focus on International
Law, 4
NIGERIAN L.J. 76, 78 (1970); Umozurike, supra note 87, at 312-13.
122. See, e.g., 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 222; J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 403 (6th
ed. H. Waldock 1966); Clark, supra note 25, at 211; Claydon, Humanitarian Intervention and
International Law, I QUEEN'S INTRA. L.J. 36, 59 (1969); Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at

299-303; M. GANJI,

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGH's 42 (1962); Hassan, supra

note 20, at 888-90; Lane, supra note 15, at 246-47; N. RoNzrIrL, supra note 10, at 108; Schachter,
supra note 20 at 1629; Waldock, supra note 19, at 461; Wright, International Law and Civil Strife,
1959 Proceedings Am. Soc. Int'l L. 145, at 152.
123. See Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 246; Moore, supra note 22, at 264. One scholar who has
changed his mind on the legality of humanitarian intervention writes:
I'm ashamed to confess that at one time I lent my support to the suggestion that article 2(4)
and the related articles did preclude the use of self-help less than self-defense. On reflection, I
think that this was a very grave mistake . . . . In the absence of collective machinery to protect
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technical legality of humanitarian intervention, almost all are willing to excuse
such conduct as a higher act of policy or morality that is "beyond the domain of
law."'124 They argue that, in extremely grave circumstances, the failure to object
on the part of the world community constitutes condonation of the conduct and,
thereby, confers upon humanitarian intervention a kind of sub-legality. 25 Thus,
there is virtual unanimity among international jurist that under proper circumstances, humanitarian intervention is justifiable on either legal or quasi-legal
12 6
grounds.
There are four principal arguments advanced in support of the sub-legality
approach. First, it is argued that a fully legalized doctrine of humanitarian intervention would increase the opportunities for abusive utilization. Second, proponents of the sub-legality view contend that the labeling of an intervention as a
technical breach of the law imposes practical and psychological restraints on the
use of force by states. Third, they maintain that an absolute legal prohibition on
the use of force preserves the clarity, simplicity and predictability of the law.
Finally, they argue that such an approach is in accordance with the Charter
27
prohibition on the use of force.
This quasi-legality view of humanitarian intervention is, like a cucumber
sandwich, ultimately unsatisfying. In the first place, it is difficult to perceive how
a technical ban prevents abusive invocation of the humanitarian intervention
doctrine or deters the use of force, when a prospective intervenor can rely on the
silence of the world community to legitimize the intervenor's action. Indeed, the
exact same conditions that would render the use of force lawful under the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention would also bring the condonation of the world
community under the sub-legality approach. Second, rather than providing clarity and predictability, the sub-legality approach is hopelessly vague and incomprehensible, as it erratically gives interventions a half-way legitimacy. An
approach that recognized the complete legality of humanitarian intervention
based on application of principled criteria would be far more simple and straightforward. Third, any system which assumes and tolerates "acceptable" breaches
of its own basic principles sows the seeds of its own destruction by encouraging

against attack and deprivation, I would suggest that the principle of major purposes requires an
interpretation which would honor self-help against prior unlawfulness. The principle of subsequent conduct certainly confirms this.
McDougal, supra note 119, at 28-29.
124. M. GANJI, supra note 122 at 43.
125. See Franck, in the debates of the Charlottesville Conference on Humanitarian Intervention
and the United Nations (March 11-12, 1972), reprinted in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 64 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Friedmann, id. at 114. See also Brownlie, Thoughts on
Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139-48 (R.

Lillich ed. 1973); Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, 290-91, 304.
126. See Bogen, supra note 10, at 303.
127. For an excellent summary of these arguments, see Behuniak, supra note 10, at 181-82.
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disrespect for the law. In the final analysis, the only argument that the sublegality approach has to commend it is that it is consistent with a sterile and
outmoded interpretation of the U.N. Charter. 2 '
The complete failure of the United Nations to heed the cries of the slaughtered
millions in Cambodia, Biafra, Uganda, Burundi, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the
Sudan is more than ample testimony of the desuetude of the collective security
arrangements envisioned in the Charter. 2 9 So long as the global conflict between
competing ideological systems continues to paralyze the Security Council, the
hope of United Nations action to prevent mass cruelty will remain unfulfilled. 30
1
It is in order to remedy the immorality of inaction in the face of state-sponsored
slaughter that an increasing number of scholars have turned to the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. Given the breakdown of international enforcement
machinery, it seems reasonable to recognize, in certain extreme cases, the legal
right of a state to use force so as to provide a form of "substitute or functional
enforcement of international human rights." 3 ' Indeed, as early as 1948, Jessup
envisioned the possibility of unilateral measures in the event that the international
organization would be unable to act "with the speed requisite to preserve life." 32
Today, Jessup's vision has become an unfortunate reality and thus it is important
to reaffirm the principle that when a state "treat[s] its own nationals in a manner
violative of all universal standards of humanity, any nation may step in and
exercise the right of humanitarian intervention."' 33
2. The Opinion of State Actors
Just as the majority of scholars have taken the view that article 2(4) prohibits
all unilateral uses of force except in self-defense, the great majority of States
during United Nations debates have favored an absolute interpretation of the
Charter prohibition. 13 4 This concensus is embodied in U.N. Resolution 3314XXIX on the Definition of Aggression which equates armed intervention with
aggression and provides that "[n]o consideration of whatever nature . . . may

128. See Behuniak, supra note 10 at 182-83; Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 249.
129. Reisman, supra note 109, at 643. See also Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 237.
130. See Behuniak, supra note 10, at 178; Lillich, supra note 10, at 246; Sornarajah, supra note 10,
at 71; Reisman, supra note 109, at 643.
131. Reisman with McDougal, supra note 10, at 178. See also Behuniak, supra note 10, at 186,
190; B. HARFF, supra note 99, at 20; Lillich, supra note 75, at 230; Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 258;
Moore, supra note 22, at 263; Somarajah, supra note 10, at 60. But see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 126,
at 145.
132. P. JESSUP, supra note 20, at 170.
133. A. Thomas and A. Thomas, supra note 26, at 19.
134. See Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the
United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 209-I1 (R. Lilliched.
1973).
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serve as a justification for aggression."' 35 Additionally, the United Nations Declarations on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States 136 and on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States, while not mentioning humanitarian intervention
explicitly, do condemn intervention in the most general terms.137 Despite such
sweeping language condemning aggression and intervention both in the General
Assembly resolutions and in statements by the various delegations, there is very
little specific condemnation of humanitarian intervention to be found during the
course of the United Nations debates. At General Assembly debates on the
Question of Defining Aggression and on Principles Concerning Friendly Nations
and Cooperation Among States, representatives of Mali, Senegal, Jamaica,
Chile, and the Netherlands spoke out in favor of humanitarian intervention to
remedy gross human rights violations such as genocide.' 38 Opposed to such a
doctrine were Nationalist China, Panama, Israel, Mexico, Romania, and a handful of others.
Abstract declarations from the halls of the General Assembly condemning
intervention in the broadest terms should not be taken as persuasive evidence of
opiniojuris. Theoretical statements interpreting the Charter as an absolute prohibition on the use of force are both popular and painless. But when nations are
faced with a real-world case of intervention to prevent state-sponsored slaughter,
they tend to show their true colors. In no single concrete case where extreme
conditions warranted humanitarian intervention has the General Assembly or the
Security Council explicitly condemned the intervening state for violating article
2(4)-Grenada and Kampuchea notwithstanding.' 39 This silent acquiescence on
the part of the vast majority of states constitutes important evidence of their
approval of such conduct.14°
The inconsistency between nations' theoretical statements on the prohibition of
the use of force and their actual, real-world responses to such use of force is
manifest. India, for example, has always championed an absolute interpretation
of article 2(4) during United Nations debates, but was still willing to invoke
humanitarian grounds in order to justify its intervention in Pakistan. 4' More
telling perhaps is the widespread agreement among non-Western states at United
Nations debates that article 2(4) prevents the use of force to protect nationals

135. G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19), U.N.
Doc. A/9615 (1974), reprinted in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 480 (1975).
136. G.A. Res. 12131 (XX) 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc A/6014 (1965).
137. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (adopted without vote at the 1883d plenary meeting, 24 October 1970)
reproduced in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
138. See Fonteyne, supra note 135, at 216 n. 78; N. RoNzrni, supra note 10, at 106-07.
139. See Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 245; Lillich, supra note 75, at 244.
140. See supra note 126.
141. See Hassan, supra note 20, at 886 n.172.
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abroad. 4 2 Yet, no one can seriously maintain that these states would not act, if
their own nationals were in serious danger of losing their lives abroad, and they
had the capacity to do so. 43 The fact that these states continue to reject the rescue
doctrine at the United Nations debates has, thus, not prevented most international
jurists from accepting the lawfulness of such rescue action. '44 Finally, in the rare
instances where states have spoken out against humanitarian intervention in the
context of a real world case, their statements have almost always been motivated
by political, rather than by legal concerns. For example, states comprising the
Organization of African Unity have consistently supported humanitarian intervention in South Africa, but rejected it in Biafra. France and Portugal, on the
other hand, have attempted to block humanitarian intervention in South Africa,
and supported it in Biafra. 45 The Soviet Union and its allies decried the rescue
missions in the Congo and Dominican Republic, but supported Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia with humanitarian arguments. Similarly, the Western states
unanimously supported the Congo action, while strongly condemning the Cambodia invasion.
In the final analysis, the conviction of most states and scholars who oppose
humanitarian intervention is of questionable strength. When states are confronted
with real-world instances of intervention to prevent mass slaughter which do not
implicate intense global rivalries, such as Uganda and Bangladesh, they will not
condemn them. 46 And when scholars who support an absolute interpretation of
the prohibition on the use of force are challenged with the moral imperative of
terminating genocide, they will go no further than to label armed intervention as
a meaningless "technical" breach of the law. In the light of such de facto approval by scholars and states of every ideological tendency, an argument rejecting
the legality of humanitarian intervention based on opinio juris is unpersuasive.
D. The United Nations CharterRevisited
The real-world practice of states has made an utter mockery of the Charter
prohibition on the use of force." 47 Those living in the "paper world of the
Charter," who stubbornly cling to the original intent of the framers, 48 would do
well to remember the fate of the world community's feeble attempt to outlaw war

142. See Fonteyne, supra note 135, at 217; N. RONZTTI, supra note 10, at 63.
143. See N. RONZITT,, supra note 10, at 65-67. The Egyptian raid on Larnaca provides an
empirical example of a non-Western state invoking the rescue doctrine. Id.
144. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
145. See Wiseberg, Humanitarian Intervention Lessons from the Nigerian Civil War, 7 HUMAN
RIGHTS J. 61, 89 (1974).
146. But cf. N. RONZITTI, supra 10, at 108-10 (maintaining that censure of humanitarian intervention by states has been sufficiently widespread to reject the doctrine).
147. See Schachter, supra note 20, at 1620; Somarajah, supra note 10, at 58.
148. Lillich, supra note 75, at 245.
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during the 1920's when no satisfactory substitute was available. 49 Because the
prospects for the effective operation of the U.N.'s collective enforcement machinery are virtually non-existent in today's world, it is essential that jurists adopt
a "rational and contemporary interpretation of the Charter," that takes account of
current state practice. Such an interpretation must conclude that when the United
Nations is incapable of functioning as an international enforcer, "self-help prerogatives revive." 50 Failure to adopt an interpretation allowing for self-help to
protect human rights will inevitably widen the "credibility gap" between the
absolute non-intervention approach to the Charter and the actual practice of
states. '' In this event, it will be all too easy to answer the question "[w]hether
refusal to compromise on the principle of absolute non-intervention will not
52
threaten the very principle itself."
Scholars who insist on a rigid interpretation of article 2(4) conceive of the
Charter as a contract or a precisely drafted piece of legislation. Therefore, they
argue, any dispute as to the meaning of the Charter provisions can be resolved by
looking to the original intent of the drafters.'53 Moreover, they are unwilling to
accept any modification in the obligations of the contracting parties unless the
strict requirements of rebus sic stantibus-or fundamental change of circumstances-are met. Thus, because the argument from plain language and original
intent support an absolute prohibition on the use of force and because the contracting states could have reasonably foreseen the failure of collective enforcement machinery, these scholars reject a contemporary interpretation of the
Charter derived from state practice. '14
Because the language of the Charter is couched in broad phrases, which
establish general principles and goals rather than specific rules, it resembles a
Constitution far more than it resembles either a contract or a statute.'55 And, if it
is indeed "a Constitution we are expounding," then it is essential that it be
interpreted in light of the realities of contemporary state practice. 5 6 As Inis
149. C. RONNING, LAW AND POLITICS IN INTER-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 83 (1963).
150. See W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 850 (1971).

151.
Lillich, supra note 75, at 248.
152. C. RONNING, supra note 149, at 83. Ronning further notes that:
It can of course continue to be honored in countless declarations and protests but if it does not
square with the hard facts of international politics, that will be the extent of its honor.
Id.
153. See Farer, supra note 7, at 390.
154. See Farer, supra note 7. See also, 1.BROWNLIE, supra note 126, at 145.
155. Wright notes that "[t]he Charter, as has often been pointed out, is not a model of precise
drafting. It is full of ambiguities and even inconsistencies making impossible wide divergencies of
interpretation and development." Q. WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 33
(1960). He continues, "the symbolic preamble and the broad assertions of purposes and principles,
provide ample opportunity for supplementing, complementing, or modifying their apparent meaning." Id. at 33-34.
156. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
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Claude suggests, "[w]hat the Charter purports to require is less significant than
what its members require it to import .... ,,157 Based on their practice, what the
states require the Charter to import is a narrow exception to article 2(4) for
humanitarian intervention to prevent mass slaughter.15
Evidence of state practice alone is not sufficient to modify the Charter. It is
also necessary to show that such state practice is consistent with the Charter's
general principles and purposes. This requirement is easily met as the Charter
59
accords paramount importance to the international protection of human rights. 1
The Preamble of the Charter itself expresses the determination of the people of
the world "to reaffirm faith in human rights" and "in the dignity and worth of the
human person."''0 Citing the preamble and the critical, first article of the Charter, 161 Reisman notes that these provisions "framed in the awful shadow of the
atrocities of the war, left no doubt as to the intimate nexus that the framers
perceived to link international peace and security and the most fundamental
human rights of all individuals." 62 This intimate nexus was strongly reaffirmed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "the inherent
dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family
is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."'1 63 The Security
Council is specifically empowered to adopt enforcement measures under Chapter
VII against any state if it considers such measures necessary for the maintenance
of international peace and security. 164 If the Security Council is powerless to take
such measures, it would be consistent with the broad purposes of the Charter to
interpret Articles 55 and 56, which authorize "joint and separate action" to
promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights," as including a

157.

1. CLAUDE, THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS

53 (1967).

158. See Sornarajah, supra note 10, at 58; note 108 supra and accompanying text.
159. See H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 28, at 178 ("human rights and freedoms, having become
the subject of a solemn international obligation and of one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter,
are no longer a matter which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Members of the
United Nations"); Lillich, supra 75, at 240.

160. U.N.

CHARTER

Preamble, para. 1(2)

161. Article I commits the United .Nations "[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of [a] ... humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms ..
" U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
162. Reisman with McDougal, supra note 10, at 171. See also B. HARFF, supra note 99, at 73
(noting that even the leading Soviet scholar, Tunkin, affirms existence of "close link between a state's
ensuring basic human rights and freedoms and the maintenance of international peace and security");
Suzuki, supra note 23, at 251-52.
163. G.A. Res. 217 A. 3 U.N. GAOR, (pt. I) at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is considered customary international law. See South West Africa,
119661 I.C.J. 4, 291 (dissenting opinion of Tanaka, J.) 441 (dissenting opinion of Jessup, J.); Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 16, 31, 36.
[19711; Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33.
164. U.N. CHARTER arts. 24, 39.
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limited right of humanitarian intervention. 65 Interpreting the Charter to accord
such a right would go a long way toward closing the credibility gap between the
fantasy of an absolute prohibition on the use of force and the stark reality of state
practice.
Acceptance of the view that state practice can, in effect, amend the United
Nations Charter will by no means emasculate the prohibition on the use of force.
Specifically, the fact that states have aggressively used force time and time again
since the Charter's ratification means only that states have repeatedly violated
article 2(4), not that they have, by their practice, modified the article's prohibition
out of existence. The distinction between practice that changes a rule of law
(humanitarian intervention) and practice that breaks a rule of law (aggressive use
of force) is that in the former case, the state admits the characterization of its
practice but simultaneously asserts that such practice does not violate the law,
while in the latter case, the state simply denies the characterization of its practice
altogether. Thus, in the case of a state carrying out a humanitarian interve'ntion,
the state will concede that its intervention was, in fact, humanitarian but Will

165. Article 55 of the Charter reaffirms that the United Nations shall promote "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
... U.N. CHARTER art.
55. Article 56 provides that "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N.
CHARTER art. 56.
This article argues that state practice has modified the Charter by providing a limited exception for
humanitarian intervention to the article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force. Strangely enough, others
who argue for such an exception seem to suggest that this was the actual intent of the framers:
Hence, the cumulative effect of the Charter in regard to the basic policies of the customary
institution of humanitarian intervention is to create a coordinate responsibility for the active
protection of human rights: members may act jointly with the organization in what might be
termed a new organized, explicitly conventional, humanitarian intervention or singly or
collectively in the customary or international common law humanitarian intervention. Any
other interpretation would be suicidally destructive of the explicit major purposes for which
the United Nations was established.
McDougal & Reisman, supra note 10, at 444. See also Suzuki, supra note 23, at 251-52. In another
work, Reisman and McDougal actually contend that the "Charter strengthened and extended humanitarian intervention." Reisman with McDougal, supra note 10, at 171.
This article does not attempt to argue that the original intent of the framers of the U.N. Charter was
to strengthen humanitarian intervention. On the contrary, it admits that the prohibition on the use of
force was intended to be absolute. The argument presented here is that state practice has modified the
Charter and that that modification is legitimate because it is not inconsistent with the Charter's general
purposes. The article also rejects an interpretation of the Charter that attempts to reconcile humanitarian intervention with the language of article 2(4) or article 51. The article 2(4) argument that
humanitarian intervention does not violate territorial integrity or political independence is untenable
because it contradicts the plain language of the Charter and relies on original intent when the article
was clearly intended as an absolute prohibition. See supra notes 23-47 and accompanying text. As
for an article 51 argument based on self-defense, the proposition that a state acts in self-defense when
it uses force to protect the nationals of the target state is too absurd to take seriously. See Akehurst,
supra note 23, at 107; see also Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 252-53.
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argue that the intervention still did not violate international law. And, in the case
of a state that engages in aggressive use of force, the state will always deny it
used force aggressively by invoking doctrines such as self-defense. 166 Moreover,
unlike a humanitarian intervention, an aggressive armed intervention could never
be consistent with the general principles and purposes of the United Nations
Charter.
Acceptance of a new interpretation of article 2(4) based on the concept that
state practice can amend it also ultimately poses a much smaller danger to the
continued integrity of the prohibition on the use of force than does an argument
for humanitarian intervention based on restrictive interpretation of the article's
original language. An argument to amend the Charter's prohibition based on state
practice necessarily requires consent by states of all ideological tendencies and,
in light of the great reluctance of states to permit any new exceptions to the
prohibition on the use of force, such ideological consensus will always create a
significant barrier to change. On the other hand, an argument to allow a certain
class of interventions based solely on a reinterpretation of article 2(4)'s language
not only does not depend on the agreement of the international community, but
can logically be made even in the face of the widespread disapproval of states.
Moreover, any exception to the Charter's prohibition on the use of force arising
from the practice of states will necessarily be narrowly defined and limited by the
nature of that practice. In the case of the argument based on reinterpretation of
articles 2(4)'s language, however, the exception to the use of force would sweep
far more broadly as a state would need only assert that the purpose of its use of
force was neither to violate territorial integrity nor political independence in
order to stay outside the article's prohibition. 67 Ultimately, an argument for
humanitarian intervention based on practice rather than purpose will be far less
destructive to the Charter's prohibition on the use of force and far more conducive to a stable world legal order.
VI.

HUMAN INTERVENTION AND THE WORLD LEGAL ORDER

The fear of abusive invocation of humanitarian intervention lies at the heart of
the argument of virtually every scholar who rejects the doctrine. They fear that
166. The example of the international legal prohibition on torture is also instructive. The fact that
many states routinely practice torture has not prevented courts and commentators from concluding
that the prohibition on torture is now a customary rule of international law. See, e.g., Filartiga v.

Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir. 1980), RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (REVISED) (1982). The principal reason for this is that states practicing torture almost
never admit to such practice, nor do they ever assert an international legal right to torture their own
citizens. On the contrary, it has been the experience of the United States Department of State that
"[w]here reports of torture elicit some credence, a state usually responds by denial or less frequently,
by asserting that the conduct was unauthorized or constituted rough treatment short of torture."
Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae quoted in Filartiga, supra at 884.

167. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 23.
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powerful states will hide their aggressive and imperialistic military adventures
behind a spurious facade of lofty and idealistic motives. 168 They argue that
history is replete with examples of states invoking bogus humanitarian grounds to
justify their aggressive behavior.169 These scholars are particularly fond of quoting Hitler's reference to the maltreatemnt of Aryan minorities before invading
Czechoslovakia, but also cite such infamous post-war examples as the Soviet
invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the American invasion
of Vietnam, and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.17 0
In the opinion of this author, the argument based on abuse is singularly unpersuasive. In the first place, if states have, in fact, invoked fraudulent humanitarian
grounds in the post-Charter era, then the genie is already out of the bottle: States
are obviously content to risk the condemnation of the world community and
could care less if scholars are labeling their conduct a "technical" breach of the
law. Moreover, the historical record only proves that abuse of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention is so obviously transparent as to render it harmless.
Certainly, no nation was fooled by the humanitarian smokescreen for Hitler's
invasion of Czechoslovakia or Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia as the negative
reaction of the world community bears out.''
Because it requires the articulation of precise criteria by which to judge the
legality of an intervention, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention actually
172
enhances the ability of the world community to safeguard against abuse.
Finally, and most importantly, the problem of potential abuse is "common to all
legal policy, doctrine or rule. ,7 3 The Soviet Union, for example, has justified its
invasion of Afghanistan as a response to the invitation of local authorities. Yet,
no one is seriously arguing for rejection of the principle that intervention upon
the request of the host government should be unlawful. Similarly, in the case of
humanitarian intervention, it would be a mistake not to recognize "an inherently
just principle [merely] because of the possibility of non-genuine invocation. 174
The inherent morality of humanitarian intervention is almost universally ac-

168. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 126, at 148; Clark, supra note 25, at 213; Claydon, supra

note 122, at 56; Farer, supra note 10, at 393; Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 290; Friedman, supra
note 75, at 578; Hassan, supra note 20, at 910-11; Schachter, supra note 20 at 1629.
169. See, e.g., Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 286.
170. See letter from Adolf Hitler to Neville Chamberlain, reprinted in Franck & Rodley, supra note
7, at 284. See also id., at 285-86.
171. See Fonteyne, supra note 135, at 220.
172. See Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 249; Lillich, supra note 10, at 218; Sornarajah, supra note 10,

at 62. Criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention have been formulated by
several scholars. See Behuniak, supra note 10, at 186-88; Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 258-68;

Lillich, supra note 27, at 347-51; Moore, supra note 22, at 263-64. Broadly speaking they fall into
three general categories: substantive, procedural and preferential.
173. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD

174. Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 269 (quoting Rolin-Jacquemyns).
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cepted. 75 Indeed, it seems mere sophistry to suggest that it is the duty of a state
to sit back and watch as millions are mercilessly slaughtered in Nazi Germany,
Bangladesh, Kampuchea, or elsewhere around the world.' 76 As Westlake writes:
It is idle to argue in such a case that the duty of the neighbouring people's[sic] is to
look on quietly. Laws are made for men and not for creatures of the imagination,
and they must not create or tolerate for them situations which are beyond the
endurance, we will not say of average human nature, since laws may fairly expect to
raise the standard by their operation, but
of the best human nature that at the time
77
and place they can hope to meet with.1
Unless the opponents of humanitarian intervention address the moral argument,
they will be eternally condemned to "an arid textual approach" that sacrifices
humanity and decency for the false sanctity of an abstract legal norm. 178
The normative argument for humanitarian intervention based on immutable
abstract principles of natural law is unlikely to persuade those jurists who maintain that law is concerned only with actual behavior and is value neutral.,79
Nevertheless, the positivists' insistence that law can only be discovered through
its sanctions should lead them to reject dogmatically the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide. 80 Because "the protection of life is a
minimum essential quality of any legal system," genocide, which destroys the
basis of human existence, bridges the gap between law and politics.' As Harff
argues, the prohibition of genocide "is a component of both natural law and
positive law; it signifies the point at which ethical ideals become identical with
'the logical ideal." 8 2 Because protection against genocide must be the minimum
guarantee of any juridical system, it is essential that the international legal order
provide adequate sanctions. In a primitive legal system where there is no overarching authority to assure compliance with its rules, the only hope for such
sanctions is that individual states will resort to the principle of self-help to punish
those who would commit mass slaughter.'83
The international community has universally recognized that genocide is a
175. See Bogen, supra note 10, at 302-03; notes 124-26 supra, and accompanying text. Scholars
who are opposed to humanitarian intervention but admit its morality include I. BROWNLIE, supra note
7, at 301; Farer, supra note 7, at 151; Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 278.
176. See, e.g., Behuniak, supra note 10, at 190; B. HARFF, supra note 99, at 25, 28; JENKS, A
NEW WORLD OF LAW? 30 (1969); Lillich, supra note 27, at 344; Moore, supra note 22, at 263;
Sornarajah, supra note 10, at 70.
177. J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 307 (1904).
178. See Fairley, supra note 46, at 61-62. In the midst of the Biafran tragedy, Arthur Leff
presented the issue of humanitarian intervention in the starkest terms when he wrote: "Forget all the
blather about international law, sovereignty and self-determination, all that abstract garbage: babies
are starving to death ....
Quoted in Farer, supra note 7, at 151.

179. See B. HARFF, supra note 99, at 28. See also L.
180.
181.
182.
183.

HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW

See, e.g., H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 62 (1949).
B. HARFF, supra note 99, at 49. See also id., at 31, 36.
Id., at 36.
Id., at 23, 37.

4-5 (1980).
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crime against the law of nations. Adopted in 1948, the Genocide Convention
itself confirms that "genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law," which the contracting parties "undertake
to prevent and to punish."1 4 It is not necessary that a state have expressed itself
willing to be bound by the Genocide Convention or the other U.N. conventions
on human rights,' because these instruments articulate customary minimum
rules and, therefore, have the force of positive international law. 186 The protection
of basic human rights has thus become a matter of international concern and it is
now too late to argue that the domestic jurisdiction principle shields states in
matters that shock the conscience of mankind.'
The failure to apply sanctions when a state violates the "minimum obligation
of national government" by slaughtering its own citizens undermines the credibility of the international legal system. 88 Thus, by finally "vindicating the law
of nations against outrage," humanitarian intervention will help produce a more
stable world order.18 9 The need for coercive measures is all the more apparent
since, as Fitzmaurice notes, the "loss of life and certain kinds of grave physical
injury are irremediable. No subsequent action, remedy, redress or compensation
can bring the dead to life or restore their limbs to the maimed. There is no
remedy except prevention. "90 Given the paralysis of collective enforcement

184. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
1948, Art. 1, 78 U.N.T.S. 280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).

CRIME OF GENOCIDE,

Dec. 9,

185. See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6316; (1966) UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Article 3 of the Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[e]veryone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person."
186. See Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15, 23 ("principles underlying the Convention are principles
which are recognized by civilized nations as. binding on states, even without any conventional
obligation"); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
518-19, 522 (1973) (citing Montreal statement of unofficial Assembly for Human Rights that the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of
the highest order, and has over the years become a part of customary international law"). See also
De Schutter, Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 21, 28 (1972);
D. HARFF, supra note 99, at 14 (international law prohibits mass slaughter whether or not acts
constitute genocide as defined in Convention on Genocide). But see Lane, supra note 15.
187. See supra note 17. See also DeSchutter, supra note 187, at 27; Ermacora, Human Rights and
Domestic Jurisdiction, 124 REcuEtL DEs CouRs 371, 436 (1968); Lillich, supra note 27, at 338;
Reisman with McDougal, supra note 10, at 172. The principle of article 2(7) of the United Nations
Charter which prevents intervention by the United Nations "in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state" is, therefore, inapplicable in cases involving serious violations
of human rights. See Behuniak, supra note 10, at 179-80; Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 240-241.
188. B. HARFF, supra note 99, at 9. See also Suzuki, supra note 23, at 234-35.
189. E. STOWELL, supra note 14, at 51-52; See also Fonteyne, supra note 10, at 269; B. HARFF,

supra note 99, at 65-67; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 28, at 32.
190. Fitzmaurice, The General Principles ofInternational Law Considered From the Standpoint of
the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 173 (11-1957).
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machinery, only the sanction of humanitarian intervention can protect the most
basic values of human life and dignity. '9' Although such a course will inevitably
involve certain risks, the alternative of inaction is morally unacceptable and at
least equally dangerous. As the Thomases put it:
[T]here is deemed to exist a conflict between the defense of human rights through
external intervention and a consideration of international peace threatened by such
intervention. Historical hindsight proves that in the long run the conflict is more
apparent than real, for peace is more in danger from tyrannical contempt for human
rights than from attempts to assert, through intervention, the sanctity of the human
personality. 192
CONCLUSION

The argument against a right of humanitarian intervention is based primarily
on an absolute interpretation of the article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force and
the fear of abusive invocation of the doctrine. The reality of current state practice,
however, has rendered the absolute prohibition of the Charter meaningless. Thus,
there exists a compelling need for a contemporary and realistic interpretation of
article 2(4) based on state practice that recognizes an exception to the Charter
prohibition when force is required to prevent mass slaughter. Moreover, history
has demonstrated that the fear of abuse is vastly exaggerated and that the international community has the capacity to distinguish between aggressive imperialistic
uses of force and armed intervention to prevent mass slaughter. Ultimately,
because there is no supranational police force and criminal court to prevent and
punish gross derogations of international responsibility, the sanction of international law depends on the willingness of the international community to isolate
and ostracize those who would transgress their international obligations. Yet, if
international law divorces itself completely from morality, the international community will not object and violations will not only go unpunished, but also
unnoticed. Having lost its sole power-the ability to influence behavior by
persuasion-international law will face the danger of extinction. Recognition of
the legality, as well as the morality, of the right of humanitarian intervention is,
therefore, essential to the preservation and advancement of the world legal order.

191. See B. HARFF, supra note 99, at 7, 47, 66-67; Lillich, supra note 75, at 241. Some authors
argue that the use of armed force to prevent mass slaughter will only increase death and human
misery. See, e.g., I. BROWNLE, supra note 10, at 224; Fairley, supra note 46, at 63. The historical
record of Bangladesh, Uganda and even Kampuchea flies in the face of such claims. See e.g., Lillich,
supra note 75, at 241.
192. See A. Thomas and A. Thomas, supra note II, at 374.

